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Harmonizing Competing Ethnonationalisms?: 




The story of present-day South Africa is one of competing 
ethnonationalisms. Whites are divided into the English-speaking 
and long-ruling Afrikaans-speaking groups. 1 Once exceedingly 
antagonistic toward one another because of historic animosities, 
the groups have now largely cast aside their differences in favor 
of a more united front against a perceived common black enemy. 2 
Blacks, as the oppressed prefer to call themselves, for decades 
have been divided by whites into Asians, Coloureds (mixed race), 
and Africans (subdivided into ten different groups). 3 Yet, the yoke 
of white domination has, contrary to government desires and with 
certain ominous exceptions, united rather than divided blacks in 
their struggle against apartheid. Thus, the major cleavage in the 
battle for a new South Africa is between whites and blacks. To be 
white is to enjoy political and economic power and privilege, 
while to be black is to be denied such advantages. The arena in 
which the battle is being fought is increasingly the legal one. This 
has been made possible in part through the extraordinary devel-
opments that have occurred in South Africa in the last year. 
The 1990s began in South Africa with some dramatic 
changes. In early February, State President F.W. De Klerk made 
a speech which many took as an indication that he was serious 
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about transforming South Africa. 4 The measures announced in-
cluded the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC), 
the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), the South African Commu-
nist Party and other groups; 5 the lifting of restrictions on thirty-
three other organizations including the powerful Congress of 
South African Trade Unions; the release of most political prison-
ers; the lifting of restrictions on 37 4 freed detainees; the limiting 
of detention without trial to six months, with provision for legal 
representation and medical treatment; and a moratorium on hang-
ings . De Klerk also indicated that he would free ANC leader 
Nelson Mandela, perhaps the world's most famous political 
prisoner, after twenty-seven years in jail. 6 
Mandela's release a few days later was accompanied by 
jubilation from many of his compatriots as millions watched 
worldwide. Mandela proceeded to tour numerous foreign coun-
tries where he was greeted by adoring crowds. At home, the ANC 
held meetings with the government on "talks about talks" and set 
up offices throughout the country . Organizing by other unbanned 
groups also went into high gear. In June, De Kl erk announced the 
lifting of the four year-old state of emergency for all of South 
Africa except Natal where fighting between those loyal to Chief 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi's rural, Zulu Inkatha movement and sup-
porters of the broad-based anti-apartheid coalition known as the 
Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) continued to claim many 
African lives.7 Although the violence continued, De Klerk later 
lifted that state of emergency as well. 
Many came to believe the promise of De Klerk's February 
speech that "[h]enceforth, everybody's political points of view 
will be tested against their realism, their workability and their 
fairness ... The time for negotiation has arrived.',s Graffiti in some 
African townships even proclaimed, "Viva Comrade De Klerk!" 
Yet, euphoria quickly evaporated as people recognized that de-
spite the unprecedented occurrences, the main pillars of apartheid 
the Natives Land Act, the Group Areas Act, and the Population 
Registration Act - remained intact.9 At the same time, the 
government was steadfast in its refusal to release prisoners sen-
tenced for offenses such as murder, terrorism, and arson on behalf 
of political organizations. To make matters worse, by December, 
South Africa teetered perilously on the brink of collapsing in 
internecine convulsions as Africans, allegedly with police com-
plicity, brutalized and murdered each other in areas throughout 
the country in conflicts fueled by urban-rural, class, and ethnic 
tensions. 10 
Even as De Klerk ordered an investigation into the situ-
ation in response to ANC allegations of government involvement, 
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it was clear that any new order somehow would have to provide 
sufficient human rights guarantees so that, at its birth, a new South 
Africa would not be baptized in blood. For both the white 
supporters of the government and the overwhelmingly black 
membership of the ANC and other anti-apartheid groups, this 
realization has led to an insistence that the constitution of a new 
South Africa contain a bill of rights to be interpreted by an 
independent judiciary. That is where the agreement ends. Closer 
examination reveals two radically different conceptions of such a 
document which reflect the clash between competing black and 
white ethnonationalisms. Indeed, it is the South African legal 
heritage that has grown out of white desire to suppress black 
nationalism, including the failure of the white minority to create 
respect for the rule oflaw among blacks, that will, inevitably, play 
adecisiverole in the fate of any bill of rights. Ultimately, the entire 
legal culture will have to be transformed before any constitution 
can be successful. 
This article proposes that some progress can be made 
toward such a transformation if South Africa adopts a constitution 
with an Africanist bill of rights. Part I explores the bill of rights 
debate currently raging in South Africa. Part II offers suggestions 
for an Africanist bill of rights. 
I. The Bill of Ri~hts Debate 
When the British colonies of the Cape of Good Hope and 
Natal joined with the two former Afrikaner republics of the 
Orange Free State and the Transvaal in 1910 to form the Union of 
South Africa, the country adopted a system of parliamentary 
supremacy. 11 This meant that with the exception of three en-
trenched constitutional clauses which had to be amended by a 
special procedure, all legislation passed by a simple parliamen-
tary majority became the supreme law of the land. Unlike the 
United States, where the judges are free to declare legislation 
unconstitutional, in South Africa there was nothing but custom to 
check parliamentary excesses. In the new polity such custom was 
lacking with regard to blacks. Accordingly, many discriminatory 
and repressive laws were passed by Parliament after U nion.12 The 
number of such laws grew prodigiously after 1948 when the 
National Party came to power with its slogan "apartheid." 13 
Custom has, however, been sufficient to restrain parlia-
mentary actions in Britain from which South Africa took its 
model. 14 The distinguishing factors there were: l) the progressive 
extension of the franchise to incorporate all elements of society, 
in contrast to the South African case where the franchise became 
less inclusive in the years after Union, and 2) a tradition ofrespect 
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for the notion of the rule of law. 
Although the concept of the rule of law has generated 
countless pages of writing, four generalizations are opposite. 15 
First, there must be representative government or to use Abraham 
Lincoln's phrase, the government must be "of, by, and for the 
people. "16 Second, there must be acceptance of the notion of 
equality before the law. Third, there must be procedural and 
substantive limits on government action against the individual. 
Thus, there is the belief that fundamental freedoms are not to be 
abrogated arbitrarily by the state. Fourth, review by an independ-
ent judiciary must be a central mechanism for constitutional 
enforcement. Central to the viability of the concept of the rule of 
law is the assumption that the legislature will adhere to such 
principles in all its decision-making. 
In the South African case, the legislature has never ad-
hered to the rule oflaw with regard to blacks. Only by abrogating 
black rights has the white-minority regime been able to ensure its 
survival. Particularly in the post-1948 years, the government has 
continually enlarged its arsenal of security legislation and since 
1983, concentrated ever greater powers in the hands of the 
executive. 17 According to South African jurist J.D. van der Vyver 
[i]nstead of applying its supremacy in accordance 
with the historical purpose of a sovereign parlia-
ment, to keep a tight rein on the powers of govern-
ment, the South African legislature on the contrary 
utilized its dominant authority to confer on the 
executive extensive, and in many instances exces-
sive or even arbitrary, competencies-thereby con-
verting the ~ ~ institution of parliamentary 
sovereignty into a~ .fu£1Q state of executive su-
premacy ... 1s 
Underlying this executive-minded behavior has been an obses-
sion with legalism (legal formalism) among the Nationalists -
there is a law for everything - and the view that such laws, no 
matter how draconian, are just simply because they are laws. 
Assisting to reinforce this obsession with legalism has 
been the all-white and nearly all-male South African judiciary 
which has been loath to challenge the executive. Supporters of the 
judges have argued that the judges merely have been acting in 
accordance with their proper role in a system of parliamentary 
supremacy, i.e. to declare the law and not to make it.19 The judges' 
task is only to see that the manner of promulgation was procedu-
rally correct and that executive action was taken "in terms of' the 
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legislation. 
In practice, however, this positivistic justification has 
been an excuse for the generally conservative judges, many of 
whom are National Party supporters, to lend approval to the 
underlying moral assumptions of the legislation they are called 
upon to construe. South African jurist M.G. Cowling has argued 
that "within the framework of legislative supremacy, the positiv-
istic approach to judicial decision-making provides an extremely 
convenient cloak behind which judges can hide their 'inarticulate 
major rremisses' by attributing inequitable results to the legisla-
tion."2 According to Cowling, these premisses are the "underly-
ing motives, perceptions, [and] political outlook[s]" that mould a 
judge's interpretation of the law as it is envisioned by the legisla-
ture. In the South African case, it is not implausible to suggest that, 
for many judges, such premisses include beliefs in white domina-
tion and continued hegemony, the need to preserve state security, 
and fear of communism. 21 
The unhappy result of the judiciary's captivity to such 
premises has been that, instead of protecting human rights, the 
courts - especially the A.D. - have routinely upheld the draconian 
will of the executive. In many cases involving security legislation, 
most recently in Omar, 22 Fani,23 and Bill,24 the courts have 
deferred to the executive's authority in matters concerning state 
security. Such cases have revealed that the judiciary, in its refusal 
to protect even the most basic civil liberties, is largely a rubber 
stamp for executive decisions. Indeed, some South African schol-
ars have even suggested that more liberal judges resign in an effort 
to underscore the proposition that, under present conditions, it is 
inappropriate to speak of an independent judiciary. 25 
Views such as these have led to calls for a redefinition of 
the role of the South African judiciary so that it could become an 
effective guardian of human rights. To effect such a change in 
orientation there have been demands for the introduction of a bill 
of rights which would give the judiciary standards for protecting 
human rights by "restricting the competence of persons in author-
ity to curtail those rights and freedoms by means of legislative or 
administrative interference." 26Consequently, some scholars have 
argued that a South African bill of rights would free judges from 
the constraints of legislative supremacy, providing a "recourse to 
a positive human rights standard that operates independently of 
the legislative will and to which the latter [ would] be subordi-
nated."27 Without a bill of rights there would be a penumbra 
surrounding the institutional jurisdiction forthe protection of civil 
liberties. Thus, the, the argument goes, the entrenchment of a bill 
of rights would not only protect individual rights and freedoms but 
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also serve to promote the institutional integrity of thejudiciary. 28 
Even as progressive scholars have sought a bill of rights, 
conservative members of the politico-legal establishment also 
have turned their attention in that direction. 29 However, their 
interest springs not from their desire to nurture the rule of law in 
a non-racial democratic state but from their perception that the 
days of white minority rule are numbered and that a bill of rights 
is the best way of safeguarding property and minority rights. With 
such disparate views, it is not surprising that disagreements over 
what form such a document should take are profound. 
A bill of rights can incorporate three types of rights. 30 First, 
procedural rights guarantee that the individual is subject to a 
judicial process that ensures equal treatment under the law, 
impartiality, and fairness. Second, substantive rights protect 
fundamental freedoms such as freedom of expression, movement, 
assembly, association, and franchise and may include group 
rights. Procedural and substantive rights appear almost univer-
sally in bills of rights. Third, economic rights guarantee the 
individual's basic material needs such as employment and hous-
ing and frequently include freedom from hunger, and access to 
free medical care and education, sometimes even tertiary educa-
tion. This last category of rights can be described as the right to 
expect. Not historically part of western constitutions, economic 
rights increasingly are being incorporated into the constitutions of 
many social democracies and third world states. 31 Economic 
rights differ from procedural and substantive rights because, as 
South African historian T.R.H. Davenport has written, they re-
flect their proponents' assumptions that diverge "from the strictly 
individualist view of society to which the more basic civil liberties 
seem logically to belong, by laying down socio-economic stan-
dards which must be realized if the individual is to be able to 
exercise his basic freedoms with profit to himself and the commu-
nity."32 
The South African debate surrounding a bill of rights 
centers on the concepts of economic and minority rights. Many 
aligned with the MDM believe that any proposed bill of rights 
must ensure, or at least must not obstruct, the economic redistri-
bution which must follow the abolition of the apartheid state. If 
there is no state-directed economic redress, the argument goes, the 
members of the white community will simply substitute their 
current racially-defined supremacy with an economically-de-
fined one reflecting their already superior economic status, a 
status acquired at the expense of blacks. 33 Moreover, the guaran-
tee of certain minimal economic standards will be the only way of 
infusing meaning into blacks' newly-secured political rights. As 
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black advocate Ernest Moseneke contends, "the right to develop-
ment. .. is probably more crucial than the right to vote; not as a 
favour which somebody hands out, but a right that you can claim 
and enforce. . . anything less than that is going to in effect 
perpetuate the present system." 34 
For many blacks, capitalism as practiced in South Africa 
and civil liberties as propounded by the government and inter-
preted by the judiciary are wedded in a conspiracy of oppression 
aimed at preserving and perpetuating inequality in economic 
relations. In this context, the concern of the ANC is not so much 
with individual property rights as it is with the enormous concen-
tration of monopoly capital in a few huge white-controlled corpo-
rations and holding companies. Drawing from the 1955 Freedom 
Charter, 35 ANC draft constitutional guidelines proposed in 1989 
emphasized the need to vest the state "with the right to determine 
the general context in which economic like takes place and define 
and limit the rights and obligations attaching to the ownership and 
use of productive capacity." 36 
The document distinguished between individual property 
owners and the collective wealth of the corporations. Accord-
ingly, it envisioned that "[p ]roperty for personal use and con-
sumption shall be constitutionally entrenched" 37 while privately-
owned companies and transnational corporations "sha]l be obliged 
to co-operate with the state in realising the objectives of the 
Freedom Charter in promoting social well-being." 38 
The inclusion of provisions such as this in a new bill of 
rights will, no doubt, fail to calm white fears of expropriation and, 
at the same time, anger blacks whose societies have been de-
stroyed by the government's policy of forced removals. Failure to 
deal with the land question will not win the government blacks' 
confidence. Yet, if Namibia, which is confronted with a similar 
problem, is any indication, the new government may not be able 
to develop a policy acceptable to both sides for some time after 
independence and maybe even never. 
The government has not offered any solutions capable of 
satisfying whites and blacks and has favored maintaining the 
status quo with regard to the protection of existing property rights. 
This preference manifested itself in the South African Law 
Commission's 1989 Working_ Paper on Group and Human 
Rights. 39 The Commission, established in 1973 by an Act of 
Parliament, consists of members of the judiciary, legal profession 
(including academic lawyers), the magistrates' bench, and offi-
cials of the Department of Justice. Its mandate was "to investigate 
and make recommendations on the definition and protection of 
group rights in the context of the South African constitutional set-
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up and the possible extension of the existing protection of individ-
ual rights as well as the role the courts play or should play ... "40 
The Commission stressed that economic rights should be 
protected only "in the negative sense that legislation and execu-
tive acts shall not infringe them. A bill of rights is not the place for 
enforcing positive obligations against the state." 41 
A number of white legal scholars have justified this 
resistance to any constitutional guarantees of economic redistri-
bution in arguments that revolve around judicial competence to 
deal with such matters. Legal scholar Cowling and Natal judge 
John Didcott contend thatthe judiciary is ill-equipped to deal with 
issues of economic policy .42 Therefore, a bill of rights should be 
free of economic standards to which the central government 
would be bound and the judiciary obliged to review. As to 
property rights, they insist that the judges be neither spoilers of 
economic redistribution nor rubber stamps for arbitrary expro-
priation. They are determined that there be a "neutral" bill of rights 
to act as a "shield" and not a "sword. "43 This neutrality is crucial, 
they maintain, because South African judges are neither qualified 
nor in possession of the resources and enforcement capabilities 
necessary to adjudicate issues arising out of economic restructur-
ing.44 Such questions of economic restructuring are "political" 
problems and not germane to jurisprudential deliberation. 
Unfortunately, these observers fail to explain why the 
judges would be ill-equipped to pass on such matters. An expla-
nation can be found in the Law Commission report's distinction 
between positive and negative rights. 45 Substantive rights seek to 
prevent the state from infringing upon individual liberties while 
economic rights seek to compel the state to fulfill an obligation. 
Thus, it is for the judges to determine that the state has acted 
arbitrarily and not that it has not complied with minimal economic 
guarantees. This argument, however, is unpersuasive. If the 
judges can ascertain whether the state has abrogated fundamental 
freedoms such as freedom of the press or speech, they can just as 
easily determine whether the government has failed to strive for 
the minimum standards enshrined in the constitution. To suggest 
that these are political problems not appropriate for adjudication 
is to engage in perpetuating the positivist myth upon which the 
South African judiciary has relied for decades. 
South African legal scholar John Dugard has taken the 
middle ground. He contends that property rights are not the sine 
qua non of a bill of rights. 46 Rather, rights of expropriation with 
delayed orreduced compensation can furnish the means of obtain-
ing economic redress. While many Africans may feel that com-
pensation is unnecessary because the whites stole the land from 
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them, the new government will still have to recognize interna-
tional economic realities. If there is no adequate compensation, 
international corporations and banks will undoubtedly consider 
the country a poor risk and the massive investment that South 
Africa will require if it is to improve the standard of living of its 
people will never materialize. 47 Even with the acceptance of 
Dugard' s suggestion about compensation, there is no reason why 
property rights also cannot be incorporated in a bill of rights. 
As for the question of minority rights, the South African 
government has insisted that these be protected in any bill of 
rights. The Law Commission's report drew a distinction between 
political group rights and other group values such as culture, 
religion, and language. 48 It determined that the latter should be 
protected as individual rights in the bill of rights and that the 
former be protected in the rest of the constitution. The ANC's 
Constitutional Guidelines also recognize culture, religion, and 
language as individual rights. 49 The idea of group political guar-
antees, however, is at odds with the document which provides for 
"a system of universal suffrage based on the principles of one 
person, one vote. "50 In October 1990, the government appeared to 
back away from its insistence on group political rights. The 
Deputy Constitutional Minister Rolf Meyer stated that the gov-
ernment had abandoned the notion of demanding recognition of 
"group rights" based on race or color "in any form whatever." 51 
Despite his rejection of the group rights approach, however, 
Meyer then indicated that the government was looking at various 
constitutional mechanisms established elsewhere to protect the 
white minority, "first of all a bill of rights." 52 
It seems that no constitution will ever receive black 
acceptance unless it creates the perception that it is bias free. The 
protection of minority interests will perpetuate existing inequali-
ties and diminish or destroy the new government's credibility. If 
a new government is truly committed to the rule oflaw, there will 
be no need for minority rights if individual rights are protected. 
Whites are not easily persuaded by such statements. After all, they 
well know that their representatives have long used the law as an 
instrument of oppression. What would prevent a black-dominated 
government from behaving in a similar fashion? Moreover, life 
under apartheid has made it impossible for many whites to 
conceive of a unitary, non-racial state. Their world view is one of 
ever competing black and white nationalisms. For them, as 
historian T.R.H. Davenport has noted, "[t]he frontiers of nation-
alism tend to stop short with the frontiers of the in-group to which 
the rights of out-groups are really irrelevant since they are pre-
sumed to be antagonistic. The nationalist, moreover, tends not to 
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think in universals, for the very concept of universality makes 
nonsense of nationalist group particularism." 53 Accordingly, the 
challenge for drafters of a bill of rights is to create a document 
acceptable to both sides. One possible way of doing so is by 
creating a document that is Africanist and internationalist at the 
same time. Such a document would appeal to international stan-
dards of human rights, particularly those which enjoy broad 
acceptance in the rest of Africa. 
IL An Africanist Blll of Riqhts 
International human rights norms are contained in many 
documents. In the African context, the most relevant is the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, popularly known as the 
Banjul Charter.54 Adopted as a regional treaty by the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU)in 1981, it entered into force, contrary to 
most expectations, only five years later in October 1986. Thus far 
it has been ratified or acceded to by thirty-five African states or 
some two-thirds of the OAU members. 55 This makes it the largest 
regional human rights system in existence. 56 While most of the 
states party to the Charter have failed to concretize the lofty ideals 
it contains, the document is significant because it reflects the 
African affirmation of international human rights standards. 57 It 
also furnishes African solutions to the issues of economic and 
group rights. 
For South Africa, use of many of the Charter's tenets in a 
bill of rights would enable it to create a truly Africanist jurispru-
dence and, at the same time, express solidarity with the rest of the 
international community on key human rights issues. Adherence 
to such principles could make South Africa a model for the respect 
of human rights not only in Africa but also in the world, a lofty goal 
but one worth striving for. 
The Banjul Charter enumerates various individual rights, 
many of which are recognized in African constitutions. Among 
them are the rights to: non-discrimination; 58 equality and equal 
protection under the law;59 life;60 the respect of human dignity; 61 
liberty; 62 have one's cause heard, i.e the right to certain minimum 
standards during legal proceedings; 63 freedom of conscience and 
religion; 64 freedom of expression and dissemination of opinion; 65 
freedom of association; 66 freedom of assembly; 67 freedom of 
movement; 68 participation in government and access to public 
services and public property; 69 and property. 70 In this respect the 
Charter has much in common with other older universal instru-
ments such as the United Nations Charter 71 and regional instru-
ments such as the European 72 and American 73 conventions. While 
endeavoring to reflect an African conception of human rights, the 
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drafters recognized that it would be imprudent to deviate too much 
from norms already established in other international human 
rights instruments. In so doing, they accepted the concept that 
human rights are universal and "transcend the boundaries of 
nation, race, and belief." 74 
At the same time, the Charter is unique among interna-
tional and human rights treaties in its enumeration of civil and 
political rights as well as economic, social, and cultural rights. The 
inclusion indicates that the two categories of rights are of funda-
mental importance and intertwined. It also refutes the argument 
by some South African jurists that both kinds of rights are not 
justiciable. 75 Nowhere in the Charter is there the suggestion that 
civil and political rights are inferior to or may be suspended by the 
government in order to promote economic, social, and cultural 
rights, or vice versa. 
The economic, social, and cultural rights guaranteed to 
individuals include the rights to: work and equal pay for equal 
work; 76 health;77 and education. 78 With regard to the practical 
application of such rights, in most African countries - and a 
majority-ruled South Africa would no exception - it is difficult to 
imagine how they can be guaranteed when the economy is not 
sufficiently developed (e.g. the right to work) or the necessary 
infrastructure is absent (e.g. the rights to health and education). 
Nevertheless, even though it may take many years before state 
action can begin to ensure anything like the full implementation 
of these rights, their inclusion mandates that existing public 
facilities be made available to all on a non-discriminatory basis79 
and provides minimum standards by which state actions can be 
judged. For example, the Charter requires non-discrimination in 
the allocation of government economic resources. Thus, a court 
could declare unconstitutional any misallocation of resources 
where the government deprived some members of the community 
of services essential to development for reasons unrelated to 
economic feasibility or general principles of proportionality. The 
role of the judiciary in enforcing such economic rights has been 
demonstrated in recent years by the judges of the Indian Supreme 
Court who, guided by specific directives contained in India's 
Constitution, have freely developed the common law.80 
The Charter also includes a right to property ownership 
which appears in the First Protocol to the European Convention 
but is absent from both United Nations Covenants on Human 
Rights. 81 This right is in line, too, with Dugard's middle path on 
expropriation with just compensation. 82 The Charter indicates that 
the right to property may be encroached upon only for public 
purposes or "in the general interest of the community and in 
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accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws. 83 At the same 
time, the state has an obligation to "promote respect, equitable 
exchange, and the principles of international law. "84 This implies 
that nationalization of property owned by foreigners such as 
multinational corporations and business assets is lawful only if the 
government complies with the appropriate international legal 
standards, including the payment of just compensation. Hence, in 
cases of expropriation or nationalization, courts are free to ascer-
tain whether the state has overstepped its bounds in taking 
property. Thus, a bill of rights based on the Banjul Charter would 
address the economic concerns of both sides in South Africa. On 
the issue of group rights, the Charter also provides guidance. 
A unique aspect of the Banjul Charter is its inclusion of 
rights attributable to "peoples." These rights, which appear even 
in the title, distinguish it from the European and American 
conventions. The drafters of the Charter believed that it was 
central to the "African" conception of human rights. It was meant 
to be reflective of the importance of the community in African 
culture, particularly because collective agricultural and other 
efforts have often been essential to ensure survival. It was within 
the group that individuals had identity in African customary law 
and expulsion from the group was one of the most serious 
punishments that could be inflicted on the individual. 85 
In fact, "peoples"' rights in Charter are the rights of the 
individual. 86 No new rights have been created and accordingly no 
new rights arise for adjudication. However, given the legacy of 
apartheid with its deliberate attempt to classify everyone as a 
member of a racially- or ethnically-defined group, a reference to 
"peoples'" rights in a South African bill of rights might appear to 
furnish a means of perpetuating divisions. To guard against the 
rise of vocal lobbies clamoring for special treatment based on a 
misinterpretation of the phrase, it would be best to incorporate 
only individual rights with no special provisions protecting group 
rights. As long as individual freedoms are guaranteed, people will 
be free to band together as they please. Certainly, this has been the 
case elsewhere in the decolonized world, most notably in Zim-
babwe and Namibia, where little has changed in the exclusivist 
world of social relations. 
There is one aspect of group rights where the Charter has 
much to offer a South Africa in which the horrors of apartheid, 
especially the migrant labor system, have destroyed the family. 
The Charter provides that the family "shall be the natural unit and 
basis of society." 87 It gives the state the duties to: safeguard the 
physical, health, and moral welfare of the family; 88 assist the 
family, which is the custodian of moral and traditional values 
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recognized by the community; 89 eliminate discrimination against 
women; 90 and protect internationally-recognized women's and 
children's rights. 91 This family-oriented approach, framed in 
terms of positive obligations, differs from that taken in the 
European 92 and American 93 conventions, which merely provide 
for the absence of interference in family life. The Charter reflects 
the drafters' belief in the family including the extended family -
as central to African values. 94 Such views would find wide 
acceptance among black South Africans who have witnessed the 
crumbling of family life under white domination. It also would 
satisfy whites, particularly Afrikaners who often stress their 
commitment to family life. Family guarantees in a South African 
bill of rights would serve as guiding principles for judges called 
upon to assess the government's compliance in the enactment of 
social legislation and the formulation of social policies. 
The obligations the Charter places upon the state are not 
one-sided. The Charter has an unparalleled approach which 
places requirements on the individual as well. In the South African 
case, these duties would demand the commitment of all to recon-
ciliation. It is not enough for individuals merely to expect protec-
tion from the state. Rather, they should participate actively in the 
creation of a more just social order. 
The African Charter stands alone among regional human 
rights instruments in its stipulation that "every individual shall 
have duties towards his family and society, the State and other 
legal~ recognized communities and the international commu-
nity.' 5 This differs from the European Convention, which is 
silent on the matter, and the American Convention, which recog-
nizes obligations to the family, community, and humanity but 
does not enumerate the duties.96 In contrast, the African Charter 
imposes a duty on the individual to consider his fellow human 
beings without discrimination. 97 It then lists specific duties such 
as respect for the family, the maintenance of parents in case of 
need, and the preservation of the family's harmonious develop-
ment. 98 Broader social obligations include the duty to place one's 
intellectual and physical abilities at the service of the community, 
to work to the best of one's ability and competence, and to 
preserve positive cultural values in one's relations with other 
members of the society in a spirit of tolerance. Additional duties 
include the preservation of national unity and the territorial 
integrity of the country and the contribution to national defense in 
accordance with the law. If incorporated into a South African bill 
of rights, many of these, although in the nature of moral obliga-
tions, at least would serve to set a tone of morality in a country 
where their denial has caused immeasurable suffering. Other 
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duties, such as the one to maintain parents, could properly be 
regarded as legal obligations enforceable in courts of law. These 
would present a challenge of interpretation to judges. Indeed, the 
issue of judicial interpretation will be one of the most vexing in a 
new South Africa.99 Ultimately, of course, it is with the people that 
the greatest challenges for any new order will lie. However, an 
Africanist bill of rights can at least aid them to overcome ethnona-
tionalistic animosities and create a more humane society. 
CONCLUSION 
In recent years, the South African government has come 
under ever increasing threats to its domination from without and 
within. Internal black protests and political organizing have 
reached unprecedented levels. Pressure from anti-apartheid groups 
around the world has persuaded many members of the interna-
tional community to bring pressure on the government through 
economic sanctions and diplomatic moves. With the advent of an 
independent Namibia, South Africa has become the only country 
in Africa still ruled by a white minority government. Already, the 
eyes of the international community are focussed on South Africa 
as the next target for change. Recognizing and in many cases 
fearing the inevitability of black majority rule, the white politico-
legal establishment which rules South Africa has recently placed 
much emphasis on introducing a bill of rights for the country. As 
discussion of this issue has raged in white political circles, the 
ANC has also turned its attention to the same issue while it 
grapples with the question of a post-apartheid legal order. Both 
sides are in particular disagreement over the issues of economic 
and minority rights. 
One way to harmonize these differences would be for 
drafters to adopt a South African bill of rights that draws upon the 
Banjul Charter. Reliance on the Charter would result in the 
creation of a document that is both Africanist and internationalist 
in orientation by appealing to international standards of human 
rights, particularly those which are widely recognized in the rest 
of Africa. While such a document alone will not free the new 
country from abuses by the judiciary and the executive, it will at 
least furnish ammunition for those South Africans - black and 
white - who are bent on harmonizing competing ethnonational-
isms so that a truly non-racial order may emerge. 
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